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Abstract 
The recent Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report on the CIA Detention and 
Interrogation Program sheds light on the practice of “enhanced interrogation” while countering 
CIA claims about the effectiveness of these methods.  This article relies on the science of 
interrogation to evaluate those claims. Five hypotheses about the (in)effectiveness of “enhanced 
interrogation techniques” are generated based upon empirical research on interrogation practices.  
The article concludes that evidence-based, non-coercive methods of interrogation are likely to be 
more, or equally, as effective as “enhanced interrogation” in obtaining accurate information from 
detainees. 
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In November 2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) released a report 
on its inquiry into the Detainee and Interrogation Program conducted by the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA).1 The report describes how the CIA detained 119 prisoners and subjected 39 of 
them to methods dubbed “enhanced interrogation techniques” (EIT).  The approved list of EIT 
encompassed waterboarding, sleep deprivation, isolation, confinement in small spaces, body 
slap, face grab (holding the prisoner’s head immobile), facial slap, walling (pushing the prisoner 
against a flexible wall), sensory over-stimulation, and forced standing and other stress positions.2  
The report also points to evidence that the CIA repeatedly used EIT not approved by the 
Department of Justice or the White House Office of Legal Counsel, such as forced standing with 
arms shackled above the head, exposure to extreme cold when partially nude, and a more 
extreme version of walling (slamming a prisoner against concrete walls).3 
The CIA repeatedly made claims to the White House, the Department of Justice, and the 
media that EIT were effective in providing intelligence that was used to save American lives and 
that this information could not have been obtained any other way.4  However, the SSCI report 
provides evidence that these claims may have been overstated.5  Following requests from White 
House officials, at least three attempts were made by the CIA to conduct studies of the 
effectiveness of EIT: a CIA Office of Inspector General Special Review, an internal review 
conducted by two CIA officers not employed within the Counterterrorism Center, and a review 
conducted by two non-CIA employees.6   The data reviewed in each case included interviews 
with CIA personnel and documents provided by the CIA.  None of these evaluations provided 
substantive evidence to support the CIA’s claim that EIT are effective. 
Any resolution of the disagreement about the effectiveness of EIT should center around 
evidence of their effectiveness in obtaining accurate, actionable intelligence from detainees.  If 
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EIT are effective, above and beyond other interrogation techniques, as claimed by the CIA,7 then 
use of the techniques may be justified.8   However, if the techniques are ineffective, as 
maintained by the SSCI, then it would be difficult to justify their use.  The purpose of this article 
is to 1) demonstrate that arguments supporting EIT effectiveness lack scientific rigor, 2) explain 
the scientific study of interrogation, and 3) apply interrogation research to generate hypotheses 
regarding EIT effectiveness. 
Scientific Evaluation of Arguments Supporting EIT Effectiveness 
 The CIA’s inference that EIT uniquely causes a source to reveal accurate, actionable 
intelligence is presumably derived from observations of detainees who were interrogated with 
EIT.9 Scientists regularly evaluate the validity of causal inferences formed through observation.  
The internal validity of a causal inference refers to how well a scientist has demonstrated that a 
cause has a unique impact on its effect.10 In order to infer that A causes B, it must be 
demonstrated that this relationship holds when other plausible causes for B are held constant.  
Without isolating the effect of EIT on detainee cooperation, it cannot be established that EIT had 
an independent effect; detainees may have cooperated in response to some other factor, such as 
length of detention or deteriorating health.  Furthermore, the relative effectiveness of EIT over 
non-EIT interrogation methods cannot be established in the absence of observations of both 
methods while holding all other factors constant.  Currently, there is no publicly available 
evidence that such observations have been made.11 
 Valid causal inferences regarding the impact of EIT on source cooperation require 
counterfactual reasoning.  Such reasoning involves answering the question, “Would detainees 
have provided less information in response to non-EIT interrogation methods than they did in 
response to EIT?”12 Due to the complexity of human behavior, speculation regarding detainees’ 
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behavior in such circumstances may be fraught with error.  As a result, it is necessary to combine 
counterfactual reasoning with observation. 
Experimentation is a research method that simulates counterfactual reasoning by enabling 
researchers to observe what happens in the presence or absence of some causal variable.13 An 
experiment designed to examine the effectiveness of EIT might proceed as follows.  A randomly 
selected sample of high-value detainees is randomly assigned to either an EIT interrogation (the 
experimental group) or a non-EIT interrogation (the control group).  The random assignment to 
groups ensures that the detainees in each group are equivalent with regard to all possible 
characteristics that might be related to source cooperation (e.g., length of detention, age, position 
in the terrorist group, religiosity, etc.).  If the detainees in the experimental group provide more 
accurate, actionable intelligence than the detainees in the control group, then the causal inference 
that EIT increases source cooperation is supported.  The control group provides the 
counterfactual (i.e., would detainees provide information if not interrogated with EIT?).  Because 
the aggregate characteristics of the members of the control group are almost identical to the 
aggregate characteristics of the members of the experimental group, any differences between the 
two groups is likely attributable to the effect of EIT.14 
 In the absence of experimental research, any causal inferences made about the 
effectiveness of EIT are vulnerable to internal validity threats.  However, any experiment in 
which participants are randomly assigned to receive EIT would be regarded by scientists as 
highly unethical.15 Nonetheless, a large number of research studies have been conducted on non-
EIT interrogation methods providing the building blocks for a “science of interrogation.” 
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The Science of Interrogation 
Interrogation can be considered both an art and a science.16 Those addressing the art of 
interrogation typically emphasize personality traits and skills unique to successful interrogators, 
qualities that cannot be taught but are either innate or may only be learned through experience. 
Hanns Scharff, who served as an interrogator in Germany during World War II,17 is a case in 
point. His remarkable success in eliciting information from American and British pilots has been 
attributed to his extremely likeable persona and naïve skill in using techniques later 
demonstrated through research to be effective.  Although researchers have been able to identify 
aspects of Scharff’s method which likely contributed to his success as an interrogator,18 it would 
be difficult to entirely reproduce his manner of interrogation because much of it was unique to 
Scharff’s personal style of relating with others. 
Although the art of interrogation is certainly an important element to consider when 
evaluating the effectiveness of interrogation techniques, this article is primarily concerned with 
the science of interrogation, which relies on evaluation through the scientific method, 
particularly experimentation.  Most interrogation research is firmly rooted within the field of 
psychology.  Interrogation has been defined as “the systematic questioning of an individual 
perceived by investigators as non-cooperative, within a custodial setting, for the purpose of 
obtaining reliable information in response to specific requirements.”19 This process of 
questioning is inherently interpersonal, making it an ideal subject to be examined by 
psychologists.20 Such research is highly relevant for intelligence practitioners who would benefit 
from basing their practice on the latest scientific evidence. Additionally, psychological research 
findings can complement the literature on interrogation in the field of Intelligence Studies in a 
manner that can inform interrogation policy.21 Intelligence scholars writing on interrogation have 
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examined questions of ethics and lawfulness as they pertain to enhanced interrogation, 22 
reviewed policies on interrogation and rendition,23 and used case studies to discuss the 
effectiveness of enhanced interrogation.24  
The study of interrogation in psychology began over 25 years ago, stemming from an 
interest in how law enforcement interrogation practices contributed to false confessions to 
crime.25 Over time, psychologists began studying which interrogation tactics could increase the 
likelihood of a true confessions and, more recently, how these tactics could convince sources in 
intelligence interviews to provide accurate, actionable intelligence.  This research has been 
conducted using two general categories of scientific methodology:  observational or 
experimental field research and experimental, analogue research.  Field research studies entail 
either observations of interrogations conducted in real-world settings or experimental 
comparisons of different interrogation techniques.  Analogue research, on the other hand, 
involves experimentation with interrogation techniques in simulated interrogation settings.  Such 
studies are typically conducted using college students as participants.   
Both research methods have strengths and weaknesses.  A strength of field research is 
that observations are made within the same context in which research findings are applied.  
Results of field research indicating that particular interrogation techniques are effective in one 
setting bolster confidence that such techniques are effective in a range of other settings.  
However, scientists conducting research in real-world settings struggle to maintain the control 
necessary to avoid threats to internal validity.  For example, a researcher studying the 
effectiveness of an interrogation tactic in a real-world setting might find it difficult to control for 
other factors that might impact source cooperation, such as characteristics of the interrogator, 
level of rapport, and the setting of the interrogation.  Another problem with field research arises 
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because ground truth (whether or not a source actually committed a crime or actually knows 
pertinent information) is often unknown.  Conversely, a researcher conducting analogue research 
can control experimental conditions and ground truth is known.  However, a common criticism 
of analogue research is that the findings may not be transferrable to real-world contexts because 
the studies are conducted in artificial settings.  A solid program of research seeks to combine 
results from both analogue and field studies; if these findings converge, then greater confidence 
in the validity of the causal inference is warranted. 
While empirical testing of causal inferences regarding EIT is, at best, difficult to 
accomplish, the large number of experimental and observational research studies conducted on 
other types of interrogation can inform hypotheses regarding the effectiveness of EIT. Such 
research provides insight about methods, other than EIT, which might be equally, or more, 
effective in inducing source cooperation.  Table 1 summarizes the research findings supporting 
all five hypotheses [INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]. 
Hypotheses about EIT Generated from Existing Research 
Hypothesis 1:  EIT may increase the likelihood of a source providing false information.      
According to the SSCI report, several detainees either fabricated information, retracted 
information, or provided low-quality reporting, including vague or repeated information, after 
being subject to EIT.26 Several qualities of EIT may increase an individual’s suggestibility or 
willingness to fabricate information, such as sleep deprivation, isolation, and interrogation 
pressure.27   
The SSCI report describes prisoners subject to EIT who were deprived of sleep for up to 
180 hours.28 Although no research has directly assessed the effect of sleep deprivation on 
THE SCIENCE OF INTERROGATION  8 
 
 
interrogation effectiveness, a robust area of study has examined the effect of sleep deprivation on 
cognitive functioning.29 Sleep deprivation affects attentional processes associated with executive 
function, which is the ability to use the working memory system to selectively attend to 
information needed to engage in adaptive behavior.  Impaired executive function worsens 
judgment and the ability to engage in tasks that require sustained attention, such as responding to 
questions in an interrogation.  When deprived of sleep, a source may become suggestible to 
influence and unable to effectively plan responses to questions.  Moreover, because sleep 
deprivation prevents consolidation of memory, a source may provide false information in 
response to leading questions and later be unable to remember the manipulative conditions under 
which he or she provided this information, leading to the source’s subsequent belief that the false 
information is actually true.30 Sleep deprivation, at best, likely degrades the quality of a source’s 
reporting and, at worst, may increase the probability that a source provides false information. 
The regular practice of extensive isolation of detainees, many of whom then experienced 
severe psychological symptoms is also described in the SSCI report.31 Observational studies of 
suspects subjected to law enforcement interrogations have found that isolation increases 
suspects’ desire to escape the situation and suspects’ uncertainty about the future, the latter of 
which significantly increases anxiety.32 These factors may compel a source to fabricate 
information in order to escape the situation.   
EIT clearly put a great deal of pressure on detainees to cooperate, which may compel a 
source to provide false information. For instance, two CIA detainees subjected to EIT reported 
having fabricated information in order to reduce interrogator pressure and one detainee 
threatened to fabricate information in response to pressure.33 In a study supporting a link between 
interrogator pressure and false confessions, subjects were led to believe that they were 
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participating in a high-stakes interrogation.34 Those subjects who provided false confessions later 
reported that they did so in response to interrogation pressure, while those who provided true 
confessions reported that their feelings of guilt prompted them to confess.   
Interrogator pressure may be related to an interrogator’s bias regarding whether or not a 
source is guilty or has relevant information.  An experiment showed that interrogators who were 
biased towards believing that a suspect was guilty chose to ask more accusatory questions and 
used more accusatory tactics than interrogators who believed a suspect was innocent.35 Both 
groups of interrogators also tried harder to get confessions out of innocent suspects than guilty 
ones.  Observers of these interrogations thought that guilt-presumptive interrogators exerted 
more pressure on suspects than innocent-presumptive interrogators and that suspects interrogated 
by guilt-presumptive interrogators were more defensive than suspects interrogated by innocent-
presumptive interrogators.  Thus, interrogators who are guilt-biased may be less able to 
distinguish between innocent and guilty suspects because their own actions induce behaviors in 
suspects that are indicative of guilt.  If this dynamic occurs in actual police interrogations, then 
the onus shifts from the interrogator to find proof of guilt onto the innocent person to prove that 
he or she is not guilty.  In conclusion, interrogator pressure that is fueled by interrogator bias 
may place a disproportionate burden on innocent detainees to provide information consistent 
with an interrogator’s expectations, even if that information is false. 
Interestingly, this relationship between bias and interrogation pressure was illustrated in 
some interrogations conducted by the CIA.  For example, after using EIT for approximately two 
months with Abu Zubaydah, interrogators determined that he did not have the information 
sought by the CIA.  However, CIA headquarters mandated continuing EIT because the goal had 
shifted from proving that Abu Zubaydah had relevant information to proving that he did not have 
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relevant information.36 The bias originated with headquarters, who then required interrogators to 
impose pressure on Abu Zubaydah in the form of EIT.  Abu Zubaydah was required to prove his 
lack of information in order to convince headquarters that its assessment of him was faulty.  
False confessions, or fabricated information, may not be problematic if interrogators were 
able to distinguish between true and false statements.  However, analogue and observational 
research has shown that individuals have difficulty doing so.37 In one experiment, a sample of 
police officers and a sample of college students were asked to classify video- or audio-taped 
confessions given by inmates as true or false.38 Accuracy in classification of confessions was not 
statistically greater than chance, meaning that participants would not have performed better had 
they guessed.  , Police officers were less accurate than college students and more confident in 
their judgments.  Specifically, they were more likely to judge a false confession as a true 
confession.   
In conclusion, several qualities of EIT may increase the likelihood that sources provide 
false information:  sleep deprivation, isolation, and interrogation pressure.  This problem is 
compounded if interrogators are unable to distinguish true statements from false statements.  
When the information confirms previous beliefs of guilt-presumptive interrogators and 
corroborating evidence is not sought, then false information may be accepted as factual.  The 
consequences of such a decision may be dire.  For example, as described in the SSCI report, four 
detainees were captured and subject to EIT by the CIA primarily on the basis of reporting by a 
single source, who was later discredited for fabricating information.39   
Hypothesis 2:  Rapport-building may be more, or equally, as effective as EIT in persuading 
sources to cooperate.   
THE SCIENCE OF INTERROGATION  11 
 
 
The SSCI report includes evidence that some individuals involved in interrogations 
recognized the effectiveness of rapport-building methods.  Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
agents interrogated Abu Zubaydah using non-coercive, rapport-building interrogation methods 
before he was interrogated by CIA contractors.40 One of them reported that the majority of the 
actionable intelligence he shared, including his identification of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 
(KSM), was provided during periods when he was interrogated by the FBI.41  In the case of 
Muhammad Rahim, the importance of rapport-building was recognized after the fact; as part of 
an after-action review of his interrogation, recommendations were made to incorporate rapport-
building in future CIA interrogations.42   
One of the arguments often employed to discount the utility of rapport-building methods 
is that EIT is necessary when a detainee holds information about an impending terrorist plot.43 
This “ticking-time bomb” argument holds that development of rapport is a lengthy process, 
whereas EIT can produce results more quickly.44 However, accounts of interrogations in which 
EIT were used indicate that EIT are not an efficient means of obtaining information.  Abd al-
Rahim al-Nashiri was interrogated with EIT for two months and Razmi bin al-Shibh was 
interrogated with EIT for 34 days.45 KSM, who was waterboarded 183 times,46 likely did not 
give up all information that he held; in fact, he regularly fabricated information.47 If there was, 
indeed, a ticking-time bomb in these cases, EIT would not have produced information quickly 
enough to prevent it from exploding.  Conversely, FBI agents interrogating Abu Zubaydah using 
rapport-building methods were able to educe actionable intelligence in only a few days.48 
Rapport-building is considered an essential part of any interrogation or interview.  
Professionals who conduct police interviews or child sexual abuse interviews are frequently 
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advised to establish rapport before beginning to question a witness49 and law enforcement 
officials recognize the importance of building rapport with witnesses and suspects.50   
Some researchers, using field research to examine the impact of rapport-building in law 
enforcement interrogations, have shown it to be generally effective in producing successful 
interrogation outcomes.51 An examination of police interviews of criminal suspects in Britain 
found a strong relationship between an interviewer’s rapport-building skills and successful 
interview outcomes.52 Subsequently, the same researchers found that, although rapport-building 
during the initial stages of an interview had little effect on outcomes, those rapport-building 
behaviors which were maintained throughout the interview significantly improved outcomes.53 
The impact of rapport has also been investigated in experimental research in which 
participants enact the role of a cooperative witness.54 In one experiment, participants were 
provided with misinformation about a mock crime event they had witnessed and were then 
interviewed about the event.55 When rapport was developed with these witnesses, they provided 
significantly less inaccurate information than did witnesses with whom rapport was not 
developed.  These results were later replicated using a similar experimental paradigm.56 
Rapport-building has also been studied in the context of intelligence interrogations.57 
Research has shown that interrogators who seek to build rapport can reduce sources’ use of some 
counter-interrogation strategies and improve information yield.58  Researchers have also found a 
positive relationship between interrogators’ reports of employing rapport-building strategies with 
high-value sources and interrogators’ reports of source information disclosure.59  
The use of EIT logically counteracts the development of rapport with a source.  Once EIT 
has been initiated it will likely be difficult to subsequently use other strategies that depend upon 
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the development of rapport to be successful.  This is probably why the Army Field Manual 
recommends interrogators build rapport and engage sources in direct questioning before 
transitioning to other approaches.60 Contrary to this practice, on several occasions, CIA 
interrogators initiated EIT with detainees before trying other interrogation methods.61 Such 
practice not only prevents interrogators from assessing initial detainee cooperation in response to 
rapport-building strategies, but also precludes observations about the relative effectiveness of 
EIT versus other interrogation methods. 
Hypothesis 4:  Information-gathering interviews and other non-accusatory interrogation tactics 
may be more, or equally, as effective as EIT in persuading sources to cooperate. 
Rapport-building has been identified as a crucial difference between interrogations 
described as “accusatory” and those described as “information-gathering” because it is not a 
typical feature of accusatory interrogations.62 Accusatory interrogations are characterized by 
control, psychological manipulation, and closed-ended confirmatory questions.  These features 
also describe interrogations using EIT, in addition to physical manipulation.  “Information-
gathering” interrogations, on the other hand, are characterized by rapport, direct positive 
confrontation, and open-ended exploratory questions.   
Some studies have examined the relative effectiveness of accusatory versus information-
gathering interrogations.  A meta-analysis conducted on twelve analogue and five observational 
field studies found that, while accusatory interrogations were effective in producing true 
confessions, they also produced false confessions.63 Information-gathering interrogations, on the 
other hand, produced confessions that were more diagnostic in that there were a greater relative 
number of true, versus false, confessions.  From the results of this meta-analysis it is possible to 
conclude that certain elements of EIT (those shared with accusatory interrogations) are less 
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effective than information-gathering interrogations in producing source compliance.  However, it 
is still unclear whether or not the element of physical manipulation that is not shared with 
accusatory interrogations provides incremental improvement in EIT effectiveness. 
Several types of information-gathering interrogations have been studied.  One method 
currently used in Britain is based on the PEACE (Preparation and Planning, Engage and Explain, 
Account, Closure, and Evaluation) model.64  In a field study, successful interrogation outcomes 
were predicted by skills related to 1) preparation and planning for the interrogations, 2) the 
“Engage and Explain” phase, particularly rapport-building, and 3) skills related to the “Account” 
phase, such as exploring obtained information, exploring motive, having a flexible interrogation 
style, and possessing conversation management skills.65 The PEACE model appears to have 
potential for improving interrogation outcomes but requires further study, particularly under 
more controlled conditions, to fully demonstrate its effectiveness. 
Information-gathering interviews can incorporate specific tactics to increase the 
likelihood of source cooperation.  One interrogation tactic that has been extensively studied is 
confronting sources with the strength of the actual evidence against them.  This was one of the 
only tactics successful with KSM; interrogators regularly presented him with information already 
known to the CIA and asked for confirmation of the information.66   
There are a number of ways in which an interrogator can use evidence to his or her 
advantage.  The Army Field Manual lists an approach called “We Know All,” which entails 
asking a source questions about information already known to an interrogator; when the source 
resists answering, the interrogator provides the answer.67 The desired outcome of this approach is 
that the source cooperates with the interrogator because he or she assumes that the interrogator 
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already knows all of the information (even though the interrogator only knows a portion of the 
information).  There have been no published studies on the effectiveness of this approach. 
Bull has developed an interrogation model, GRIMACE (Gathering Reliable Information 
prior to the interview, Motivating an Account, Challenging Effectively), which offers another 
way to incorporate evidence during an interrogation.68 This model reflects the findings of 
laboratory and field research examining the ideal point during an interrogation to reveal 
evidence.  Bull argues that revealing evidence too soon can advantage the source because he or 
she can fabricate a narrative of events, which includes the evidence, making it difficult for 
interrogators to differentiate between true and false statements.  The GRIMACE model might 
allow interrogators to compare a source’s version of events with evidence that has been obtained 
about a crime; inconsistency between the suspect’s statement and the evidence is an indication of 
deception. 
Another method similar to GRIMACE, the Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) tactic, has 
been supported by an extensive program of research. In the first experimental study examining 
this technique, participants who were either innocent or guilty of a mock crime were 
interrogated.69 In half of the interrogations, evidence against the participant was presented at the 
beginning of the interview; in the other half, evidence was presented after the participant 
provided a free narrative of the event and answered open-ended questions about the event.  
Observers who watched video recordings of the late-disclosure interrogations were more 
accurate in determining which deceptive statements were actually deceptive than observers who 
watched the early-disclosure interrogations.  Later studies have replicated this effect and found 
that the greater accuracy of judgments of late-disclosure versus early-disclosure interrogations is 
attributable to greater statement-evidence inconsistency among guilty, but not innocent, 
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participants who take part in the late-disclosure interrogations. Interestingly, guilty subjects 
participating in the late-disclosure interrogations overestimated their success in convincing 
interrogators of their innocence, indicating that they were not aware that the SUE technique 
improves lie detection accuracy.70   
Although SUE has improved accuracy in differentiating between guilty and innocent 
suspects, it failed to improve the number of confessions obtained from guilty suspects.71 One 
variant of SUE, called SUE-Confrontation, was shown to improve the number of admissions to 
participation in a mock crime.72 In this study, interrogators held information about the first two 
phases of a mock crime, but not about the last phase.  In the SUE-Confrontation condition, 
interrogators confronted participants each time a statement was inconsistent with the evidence.  
Participants in this condition were more likely than participants in early-disclosure or no-
disclosure interrogations to believe that the interrogator held information about the last phase of 
the mock crime and they were more likely to admit to elements of the last phase of the mock 
crime.   
Another variant of the SUE technique, SUE-Incremental has been shown to be effective 
in increasing the number of within-statement inconsistencies over the basic SUE technique and 
early-disclosure interrogations.73 In the SUE-Incremental interrogation, evidence was disclosed 
incrementally, rather than all at once; the weakest, least specific evidence was disclosed first and 
the strongest, most specific evidence was disclosed last.  Participants taking part in this 
interrogation were most likely to contradict their previous statements.  In summary, the SUE 
technique seems to be an effective means for discriminating between guilty and innocent 
individuals and eliciting information from sources.  Although it has not been tested with real-
world interrogations, one study did train police officers to use the technique effectively.74 
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Granhag and colleagues offer another way to use evidence during an interrogation 
through a method called the Scharff Technique, which is based on the interrogation style of 
Hanns Scharff.  Scharff was extremely adept at non-coercive elicitation, wherein prisoners were 
unaware that they provided him with important information.75 The Scharff Technique includes 
four components:  1) the interrogator maintains a friendly approach, 2) the interrogator does not 
pressure the source for information, 3) the interrogator maintains the illusion of already knowing 
all of the information being discussed with the source, and 4) the interrogator does not ask direct 
questions, but merely requests that the source either confirm or disconfirm information.76 
In a series of four studies, the authors demonstrated that participants interviewed using 
the Scharff Technique generally provided more new information (information not revealed by 
the interviewer) than participants interviewed using the Army Field Manual Direct Approach.77 
Additionally, these participants perceived the interviewer to have more information than what 
was perceived by participants taking part in interviews using the Direct Approach.  Furthermore, 
participants undergoing interviews using the Scharff Technique were generally less able to 
discern the intelligence requirements of the interviewer than participants undergoing interviews 
using the Direct Approach.  Finally, and most importantly, participants taking part in interviews 
using the Scharff Technique generally underestimated the amount of information that they 
provided to the interviewer, while participants taking part in interviews using the Direct 
Approach generally overestimated the amount of information that they provided to the 
interviewer.  This last point is especially important because the crux of elicitation is that 
interviewers are able to obtain relevant, new information from a source without the source’s 
awareness.  In the most recent study investigating the Scharff technique, the researchers found 
that the difference between the amount of information provided during interviews using the 
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Scharff Technique and information provided in interviews using the Direct Approach was 
greatest for the most resistant sources.78 In other words, the Scharff Technique was most 
effective for the most recalcitrant sources. 
 In conclusion, research findings indicate that information-gathering interrogation 
methods which incorporate rapport-building can be effective in inducing cooperation from a 
resistant source.  There is also evidence that information-gathering interrogations can be more 
effective than accusatory interrogations in producing diagnostic confessions.  One effective 
interrogation tactic is providing sources with evidence obtained by interrogators. However, the 
success of this tactic depends upon the interrogator having acquired information about the source 
and the context in which he or she was captured.  The importance of this pre-interrogation 
planning is emphasized in the Army Field Manual.79  Its significance was also demonstrated in 
the case of the interrogation of Muhammed Rahim who was interrogated by the CIA using EIT; 
the after action review of his case cited lack of knowledge of Rahim as one of the major factors 
contributing to his unresponsiveness during interrogation.80 
Hypothesis 4:  EIT may impede accurate memory of events. 
Once an interrogator is able to overcome source resistance, debriefing of the source 
begins.  During debriefing, the interrogator obtains information from the source that is necessary 
to meet intelligence requirements.81 This must be done in a manner that facilitates accurate 
recollection of events so that any information obtained from sources is credible.  However, 
memory is malleable and several factors may impede accurate memory retrieval.  First, memory 
retrieval may be affected by stress.82 Psychological and physical stress are inherent components 
of EIT.  Second, sleep deprivation can affect many aspects of cognitive function, including 
memory retrieval.83 Most detainees subjected to EIT were exposed to sleep deprivation; several 
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of these detainees also experienced hallucinations and one detainee could barely speak.84 It is 
difficult to imagine that anyone in such a psychological state would be able to provide an 
accurate and coherent accounting of events or facts.  Third, a large body of research has 
demonstrated that interviewing methods incorporating misinformation can contribute to the 
development of false memories of events.85 For instance, Survival Escape Resistance and Escape 
(SERE) school students who were exposed to misinformation about events occurring during 
interrogation incorporated the misinformation into later recounting of events.86 EIT involves 
repeated questioning based on the assumption that detainees hold required information.  If a 
detainee does not hold such information, then this questioning introduces the detainee to new 
information which may distort his or her memory of an event.  It is vital to note the important 
distinction between providing a source with accurate information or evidence and providing a 
source with inaccurate information or evidence.  While the former may be helpful in overcoming 
resistance and detecting deception, the latter may contribute to memory distortion.  In 
conclusion, EIT incorporates a number of factors which can produce inaccurate retrieval of 
information from memory. 
How can interrogators facilitate accurate memory retrieval? The Cognitive Interview (CI) 
is a debriefing method that has been shown to be effective in improving accurate recollection.87  
The CI encompasses the following memory retrieval techniques: 1) context reinstatement 
(having sources attend to the context in which events took place, such as the time of day, the 
weather, or what they were wearing), 2) asking sources to report everything they can remember 
about the events, 3) asking sources to remember events from their own perspective, as well as 
that of others, and 4) having sources remember events in a different temporal order, such as 
starting from the end of an event and telling the story backward.88     
THE SCIENCE OF INTERROGATION  20 
 
 
The CI and its variations have been studied extensively.  A meta-analysis included 46 
experimental research studies comparing the CI to other interview methods concerning the 
number of correct, incorrect, and confabulated details produced by sources participating in these 
interviews.89 The CI was found to greatly increase the number of correct details recalled over 
other interview methods, to slightly increase the number of incorrect details recalled, and to have 
no effect on the number of confabulated details recalled.  The CI, thus, seems to be effective in 
significantly improving correct recall of events, even if it also facilitates the production of a 
small number of incorrect details.  This technique can also be combined with other non-coercive 
interrogation tactics to overcome resistance. 
Hypothesis 5:  EIT may be less effective than other methods for determining the validity of a 
source’s statement.   
An important part of the interrogation process is assessment of the veracity of obtained 
intelligence.90 The consequences of inaccurate judgment can be disastrous, leading, for example, 
to the failure of an operation based on a misinformed plan.  A robust body of research has 
generally demonstrated that humans have difficulty detecting deception.91 Most of this research 
has been conducted using analogue experimentation because, in field studies, ground truth is 
unknown.  In a typical deception detection experiment, a sample of participants is randomly 
assigned either to engage in a mock crime and lie about it or to engage in a non-criminal task and 
tell the truth about it.  Other participants watch video recordings of the interviews and make a 
judgment about who is lying and who is telling the truth.  A meta-analysis conducted on 206 
studies of this type found that naïve observers (those without any training) correctly 
differentiated between truth-tellers and liars on average of 54% of the time.92 This is not much 
better than chance; observers may just as well have tossed a coin to decide who was lying and 
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who was telling the truth. Additionally, experts (i.e., police officers, judges, psychiatrists) were 
found to be no better able to discriminate liars from truth-tellers than non-experts (i.e., college 
students).  Thus, this meta-analysis indicates that people generally are not effective at detecting 
deception. 
 A later meta-analysis examined 247 samples from experimental studies that included 
19,801 judges of deception and 2,945 senders (liars or truth-tellers) to determine whether or not 
differences existed between people’s ability to detect deception and whether or not this 
difference might depend upon the believability of senders.93 The researchers found no individual 
differences in people’s ability to detect deception.  However, there were individual differences in 
deception detection bias; that is, whether a person is predisposed toward perceiving a sender as a 
truth-teller or a liar. The meta-analysis also detected individual differences in the credibility and 
detectability of senders.  In other words, some senders were more believable than others, 
especially when they were lying, while the lies of other senders were frequently detected.  These 
two factors, credibility and detectability, were much more influential on deception judgments 
than senders’ actual deception.  
 Why is it so difficult for people to detect deception?  First, senders differ in their ability 
to tell lies, when judges of deception assume that cues to deception are universally displayed by 
liars, they are more prone to error.  Second, some individuals are biased in their judgments 
towards truth or deception.94 Police officers are particularly biased towards judging people to be 
lying when they deny having committed a crime.95 As discussed earlier, biased interrogators may 
behave in ways that cause innocent sources to react in a manner perceived by others as guilty or 
deceptive, thereby confirming to the interrogators that their judgment of these sources was 
accurate, even when it was not.96 When this occurs, interrogators do not receive accurate 
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feedback about the validity of their judgments, which is problematic because feedback about 
accuracy has been demonstrated to improve deception judgments.97 
Third, there are few verbal or nonverbal behaviors that are valid indicators of deception.  
A meta-analysis was conducted on 116 experimental studies that examined which verbal or non-
verbal behaviors, referred to as cues, could be used to correctly classify someone as a truth-teller 
or a liar. 98 Across all studies, 158 cues were coded.  The researchers found that the verbal and 
non-verbal behavior of liars and truth-tellers did not generally differ. Furthermore, for those few 
cues which did discriminate between truth-tellers and liars, the difference between them was 
quite small.  This means that judges of deception have few objective criteria on which to base 
their judgment. 
 Fourth, those who detect deception may attend to cues that are not reliable indicators of 
deception, an idea referred to as the “wrong subjective cue hypothesis”.99 The validity of this 
hypothesis depends on whether or not judges of deception are aware of which cues they use to 
form judgments.  In a recent meta-analysis, researchers found that those cues which people 
identify as important in their judgments of deception are not the same as the cues they actually 
use in their judgments of deception.100 The researchers included studies which examined the 
relationship between cues and deception judgements and the relationship between cues and 
actual deception.  They found that some of the cues that judges unwittingly relied on to make 
deception judgments were the same cues that enabled accurate discrimination between liars and 
truth-tellers.  Thus, the difficulty in detecting deception may not lie in the use of invalid cues to 
deception but in the limited utility of deception cues, in general, for discriminating truth tellers 
from liars.  In order to increase the utility of cues to deception, the authors recommended 
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employing interrogation tactics which increase behavioral differences between truth tellers and 
liars.   
 Which tactics should interrogators use to elicit valid cues to deception?  Some tactics 
may elicit cues through increasing a source’s cognitive load, the demand on cognitive processes 
inherent in particular tasks.101 One task that may increase the cognitive load of liars, but not 
truth-tellers, is responding to unanticipated questions.  Liars practice their responses to standard 
interview questions (“Where were you on the night of April 15th?”) because such questions can 
be anticipated.  Liars can only practice responses to questions they can anticipate.  When an 
interrogator poses an unanticipated question (“Describe the layout of the restaurant where you 
say you ate dinner”), liars use more cognitive resources than truth tellers to generate responses 
because those responses are untrue. This leaves fewer cognitive resources available for managing 
behaviors that serve as cues to deception (hedging or fidgeting).  Research has shown that 
unanticipated questions yield a cue to deception (level of detail), which enables observers to 
discriminate between liars and truth-tellers.102 Liars who are asked unanticipated questions 
provide less detail in their responses than truth-tellers; liars also provide less detail in response to 
the unanticipated questions in comparison to anticipated questions.103  
 The unanticipated questioning tactic has also been researched in relation to deception 
about future activities because one goal of HUMINT interrogations is to obtain information 
about enemy intentions. Individuals with mal-intent attempting to pass through security at a port 
of entry may prepare answers to anticipated security questions about their intended activities or 
travel plans.104 However, such individuals may have difficulty answering unanticipated questions 
about how they went about making those travel plans. In one study, participants were instructed 
to plan to engage in either a criminal or non-criminal act and were then interrogated about their 
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intentions.105 Those who planned to engage in a criminal act were told to lie about their 
intentions during the interrogation.  Although the detail and length of the liars’ statements in 
response to questions about their intentions (anticipated questions) did not differ from those of 
truth-tellers, liars statements in response to questions about how they planned the activity 
(unanticipated questions) were less detailed and shorter than truth tellers’ statements.  The 
unanticipated questions about planning elicited cues that could be used to distinguish liars from 
truth-tellers. 
When implemented in interrogations with pairs of sources, asking unanticipated 
questions can elicit within-pair inconsistencies in liars’ statements.106 Because pairs of liars 
cannot jointly prepare responses to unanticipated questions, each may respond differently to such 
questions; this inconsistency serves as a cue to deception.  Another type of inconsistency, 
statement-evidence inconsistency, is also a useful cue for deception107 and can be elicited 
through the SUE technique. 
In closing, tactics shown to be successful in improving deception detection induce a 
cognitive burden on a source, eliciting cues which allow an interrogator to discriminate between 
truthful and deceptive sources.  In contrast, EIT induces a physical burden on a source to 
cooperate.  Because this burden is likely to be similar for liars and truth-tellers, there is no reason 
to believe that EIT improves the interrogator’s ability to form accurate judgments about 
deception.  Indeed, evidence is repeatedly presented throughout the SSCI report that 
interrogators using EIT were often unable to ascertain when detainees provided inaccurate 
information and when detainees truthfully denied knowledge of required information.108 
The Future of Interrogation Research 
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The psychology literature reviewed in this article can inform both the practice of 
interrogation and related debates about intelligence practices. However, the validity of the five 
hypotheses developed in this article must be addressed through additional interrogation research 
studies.  The importance of such research was recognized by President Obama when, in 2009, he 
signed Executive Order 13491, which established the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group 
(HIG).109 The HIG is administratively housed within the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is 
comprised of interrogators from across the Intelligence Community who interrogate sources 
deemed to hold high-value information.  The Executive Order established a component of HIG 
that sponsors research on effective interrogation methods.  In the five years since its inception, 
HIG-sponsored research has significantly added to the body of literature on intelligence 
interrogation, and enabled HIG interrogators to practice evidence-based interrogation 
methods.110 
In stark contrast to evidence-based interrogation methods, EIT appear to have little 
empirical justification.111 EIT were developed by psychologists James Mitchell and Bruce 
Jessen, two former SERE school instructors contracted by the Department of Defense and CIA to 
provide consultation on the interrogation of detainees.112 During SERE training, US military 
personnel are subjected to treatment similar to EIT in order to learn counter-interrogation 
strategies.  Mitchell and Jessen reverse-engineered interrogation tactics used during SERE 
training to interrogate detainees;113 they believed that such methods would induce a state of 
learned helplessness in detainees,114 causing them to comply with interrogator demands.   No 
published evidence supports this assumption.115 Even if EIT effectively produced a state of 
compliance in detainees, it does not necessarily follow that EIT would induce sources to provide 
accurate information.  Interrogations intended to produce compliance have historically had the 
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objective of obtaining false confessions for propaganda, not obtaining accurate, actionable 
intelligence.116  
Executive Order 13491, thus, represents a welcome shift from non-evidence-based 
interrogation methods to a search for evidence-based interrogation methods discoverable through 
scientific research.  It remains to be seen whether or not the next administration will provide 
additional support for this effort. 
 
Conclusion 
The hypotheses generated from the state of the research on interrogations contradict 
claims that EIT are uniquely effective means of obtaining accurate information from sources.  
Alternatively, information-gathering interrogations that incorporate rapport-building behaviors 
and cognitive-based methods of deception detection are promising avenues for overcoming 
source resistance.  However, these methods must be field tested in order to support their use in 
non-laboratory settings.  Such research is necessary to enable interrogators to protect national 
security more effectively. 
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